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JURISDICTION 
The Appellee, Loel D. Thometz ("Thometz") does not dispute 
the Jurisdiction section which appears upon page 1 of Appellant's 
Brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Thometz submits the following objections to the Statement 
of Issues section which appears upon pages 1 to 5 of Appellant's 
Brief: 
1. Appellant's Issue I, which asserts that the 
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in applying the prima 
facie case method of analysis established by McDonnell-Douglas 
Corp, v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is not properly before the 
Court, due to Appellant's failure to preserve such issue within 
its Motion for Review, dated April 11, 1995 (R. 761-769). Utah 
law states that alleged errors within agency orders that are not 
brought to the attention of the agency by way of a motion for 
review are waived. Ashcroft v. Industrial Com'n. of Utah, 855 
P.2d 267, 268 (Utah App. 1993). 
Further, Appellant's Issue I erroneously assumes that 
the ALJ based his decision in this case solely upon a finding 
that Thometz established a prima facie case of age 
discrimination. In fact, the ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order, dated March 13, 1995 ("Order") (R. 748-760), 
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clearly reflects that the ALJfs analysis properly focused upon 
the essential issue in the case, ie„, whether Thometzf age was a 
determining factor in his selection for reduction in force 
("RIF"). Faulkner v. Super Value Stores, 3 F.3d 1419, 1425 (10th 
Cir. 1993). 
2. Appellant's Issues II, III, IV, VIII and X challenge 
the ALJ's findings of fact under the substantial evidence 
standard of review. However, said Issues are not properly before 
the Court because Appellant has made no attempt to marshal1 the 
evidence in support of the ALJ's findings, as required by Utah 
law, Qneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage, 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-54 
(Utah App. 1994). 
Further, Appellant's Issues III, IV, V and VIII 
improperly designate as separate issues specific items of 
evidence which support the ALJ's finding that age was a 
determining factor in Thometz' selection for RIF. Appellant's 
Issues III, IV, V and VIII are all included within the section of 
Appellant's Argument which challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence (Appellant's Brief at pages 23-37). The specific items 
of evidence which are challenged within Appellant's Issues III, 
IV, V and VIII are not independently required to meet the 
substantial evidence test. Larson Limestone Co. v. State Div. of 
Oil, Gas & Mining, 903 P.2d 429, 430 (Utah 1995). 
3. Appellant's Issues VI and VII erroneously designate as 
issues of law issues which are clearly factual in nature. Said 
issues are both included, along with Appellant's Issues III, IV, 
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V and VIII, within the section of Appellant's Argument which 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence (Appellant's Brief, 
pages 32-37). Further, to the extent that such issues constitute 
alleged errors of law, they were not preserved within Appellant's 
Motion for Review (R. 761-769). 
4. Appellant's Issue IX erroneously asserts that the 
Agency determined that Thometz had no duty to mitigate his 
damages. The Agency made no such determination. The Agency 
merely noted that Appellant could have mitigated its own damages 
by reinstating Thometz, as Appellant was ordered to do within the 
Order of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division ("UADD") dated 
February 9, 1994 (R 10-17; 748-760; 816-820). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Thometz does not dispute the Nature of the Case, Course of 
the Proceedings, and Disposition of the Agency sections which 
appear upon pages 5 to 7 of Appellant's Brief. 
Thometz objects to the Statement of Facts section which 
appears upon pages 7 to 26 of Appellant's Brief, on the grounds 
that Appellant has made no effort to marshal1 the evidence in 
support of the ALJ's decision, and has merely presented selected 
facts in support of Appellant's position. Such approach 
improperly burdens the Court and the Appellees, and is contrary 
to Utah law. Oneida/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1053-1054. 
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The improper burden which Appellantfs failure to marshall 
the evidence has placed upon Thometz is demonstrated, in part, 
by the following facts which are not even mentioned within 
Appellant's Brief: 
(a) At the time of Thometz1 termination, Thometz had 
a higher overall rating on his most recent Performance Appraisal 
Report ("PAR") than one of the younger employees who was retained 
by Appellant (R. 256-268). 
(b) During the reduction in force ("RIF") in which 
Thometz was terminated, 9 out of the 15 employees who were RIFed 
from Thometz1 department were over the age of 40, and 8 of such 
employees, including Thometz, were over the age of 50 (R. 219). 
(c) Lisa Hughes ("Hughes") who was Thometz1 manager 
and the person who selected Thometz for RIF, did not review any 
documentation, nor talk to any of her employees regarding their 
skills or experiencef in relation to her RIF Selection (R. 1020). 
Hughes did not have detailed knowledge concerning the work 
performed by the employees within her department (R. 1044). 
Hughes created no documentation in conjunction with her RIF 
selection, except for the ranking sheet (R. 1008; 1032). In sum, 
Hughes had little if any objective criteria upon which to base 
her selection of Thometz for RIF. 
(d) Hughes allegedly based her selection of Thometz 
for RIF upon the alleged fact that Thometz1 experience within the 
Specialty Structures facility, which Hughes supervised, was 
limited to one program that was ending (R. 1022; 1030; 1044-55). 
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However, Appellant's own work records support the testimony of 
Thometz and Chuck Walker ("Walker") that Thometz worked upon all 
of the programs within the Special Structures facility, and that 
the program which was allegedly ending continued to require 
substantial work until at least November 16, 1992 (R. 205; 375-
386; 859-862; 939-941). Further, Thometz testified that Hughes 
personally observed him performing work on a variety of programs 
within the Specialty Structures facility (R. 860-861). The ALJ 
expressly found that Hughes1 testimony of this issue lacks 
credibility (R. 780). 
These examples demonstrate the burden which has been placed 
upon Thometz due to Appellant's failure to marshall the evidence 
in support of the ALJ's findings. Appellant has improperly 
shifted to Thometz the burden of summarizing the entire 
proceeding within the Agency in order to rebut Appellant's 
selected allegations of error. 
Without waiving such objection, Thometz responds to the 
specific numbered paragraphs of Appellant's Statement of Facts as 
follows: 
1. Thometz admits the allegations of Paragraph 1 of 
Appellant's Statement of Facts. However, the persons who hired 
Thometz at the age of 45 were not involved in Thometz1 RIF 
selection eight years later (R. 839). In fact, Walker, who 
participated in hiring Thometz, testified that Thometz' selection 
for RIF may have been motivated by his age (R. 943). 
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2-3. Thometz admits the allegations of Paragraphs 2-3 of 
Appellant's Statement of Facts, which briefly describe Thometz1 
work history at Hercules. However, Appellant makes no reference 
to the outstanding PARs which Thometz received (R. 279-297), or 
to the awards and commendations which Thometz received (R. 298-
301), or of Thometz1 assignment to particularly technical work 
assignments due to Thometz1 demonstrated work performance (R. 
952, 981). 
4. Paragraph 4 of Appellant's Statement of Facts, which 
describes the extensive RIFs which Appellant has experienced due 
to economic downturns in the aerospace and defense industries, is 
not disputed by Thometz. However, such facts are not relevant to 
the issue of whether Thometz1 selection for RIF was substantially 
motivated by his age. Age discrimination may occur during RIFs 
which are economically motivated. James v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
Inc., 21 F.3d 898 (10th Cir. 1994); Branson v. Price River Coal 
Co., 853 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1988). 
5-8c Appellant's Statement of Facts, Paragraphs 5-8, 
contain numerous allegations regarding the RIF policy which 
Appellant had in effect at the time of Thometz1 RIF (R. 30-36). 
Thometz doe3 not dispute that said RIF Policy was in effect. 
However, many of the specific provisions of said RIF Policy were 
not applied in Thometz1 case. Specifically: 
(a) The criteria of "prior experience", "education 
applicable to the job," "relative ability" and 
"adjusted service date/then continuous service" which are 
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identified as factors to be considered within Section I. of 
Appellant's RIF Policy (R. 33), were given no consideration in 
relation to Thometz' RIF (R. 1020-1021). 
(b) The Business Group or Unit did not design a new 
organization indicating the changes and reductions on the new 
organization chart, as required by Section II. of the RIF Policy 
(R. 33; 1031-1032). 
(c) The Unit Executive did not prepare copies of the 
current organization chart identifying those positions to be 
eliminated, transferred or combined, or identifying the current 
incumbents for each position, as required by Section II.a. of the 
RIF Policy (R. 1033-1034). Appellant does not even know who the 
Unit Executive was in relation to Thometzf RIF (R. 1031; 1037). 
(d) The Unit Executive did not prepare a new 
organization chart identifying the recommended candidate for each 
position, as required by Section II.b. of the RIF Policy (R. 34; 
1034). 
(e) The Unit Executive did not prepare a listing of 
each person selected for RIF with the information required by 
Section II.c. of the RIF Policy (R. 34; 1034-1037). 
(f) It is not known whether the Unit Executive 
presented his/her rationale for the RIF selection to the PCC, as 
required by Section III.a. of the RIF Policy (R. 34), inasmuch as 
none of Appellant's agents recall what, specifically, was said 
regarding the reasons for Thometz' selection for RIF, and no 
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documents were created which reflect any such reasons (R. 1031-
1033; 1060-1061; 1093-1095). Hughes testified regarding her 
meeting with the PCC as follows: 
Q. What was said during that meeting? 
A, Went through the rankings, I was asked questions 
by the committee. 
Q. What were some of the questions you were asked by 
the committee? 
A. Why people were ranked, you know, why were the 
people ranked as they were? Why one individual 
was better than another individual, those were the 
types of questions. 
Q. Did you respond to those questions? 
A. I did. And particularly, you know, most of the 
questions is centered around depicting out some of 
the, in all honesty, the younger people going, why 
is this person better than someone else? And I 
went through and I discussed everything based on 
people's performance or competency in those 
additional areas. 
Q. Was there any discussion as to the greater 
performance evaluations during the PCC meeting? 
A. No. They were basing it off of my performance 
with those individuals over the last period of 
time, I guess, since those people had been in my 
department, for the year (R. 1031-1032). 
(g) Thometz was not provided at least 25 days notice 
of his RIF, as required by Section V. of the RIF Policy (R. 36, 
1039-1040). 
9. Thometz does not dispute Paragraph 9 of Appellant's 
Statement of Facts. 
10. With reference to Paragraph 10 of Appellant's Statement 
of Facts, there are numerous iacts which support the ALJ's 
determination that Appellant's professed non-discriminatory 
justification is pretextual, including the following: 
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(a) At the time of Thometz1 RIF, Thometz had a higher 
rating on his most recent PAR than one of the younger employees 
who was retained (R. 256-268). 
(b) Hughes admits that she did not review any 
documents, including PARs or employee work histories, in making 
her RIF selection, which is contrary to Appellant's RIF Policy. 
Hughes states that her RIF selection was based solely upon her 
personal observations of the employees in the workplace (R. 1031-
1032). However, Hughes also states that she was not aware of the 
details of such employees1 work performance (R. 1044). 
(c) Hughes did not create any documentation which 
supports or reflects her selection of Thometz for RIF, which is 
contrary to Appellant's RIF Policy (R. 30-36; 1008; 1032). 
(d) Although Hughes testified that Thometz worked only 
on one program, "the Tubes", which program was winding down at 
the time of the RIF, Appellant's records support the testimony of 
Thometz and Walker that Thometz worked on all of the programs 
within the Specialty Structures facility, and that the Tubes 
program was not winding down (R. 205; 375-386; 859-862; 939-941). 
Further, Thometz testified that Hughes directly observed Thometz 
working on the various projects within the facility (R. 860-861). 
The ALJ expressly found that Hughes1 testimony that Thometz 
worked on only one program, and/or that Hughes was not aware of 
the work that Thometz was performing, was not credible (R. 780). 
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11-15. Paragraphs 11-15 of Appellant's Statement of Facts 
contain numerous allegations regarding the testimony of Gerry 
Nuttal, ("Nuttal") who was Thometz1 direct supervisor, and who 
also ranked Thometz last of the employees within the Specialty 
Structures facility. Thometz does not believe that Nuttalfs 
ranking was motivated by age discrimination (R. 1157). Nuttalfs 
testimony constitutes the primary evidence in support of 
Appellant's position, and is probably the primary issue on this 
Appeal. 
Nuttal resigned his employment with Hercules during April of 
1992, which was four months prior to Thometz' RIF (R. 1104). At 
that time, Thometz had been under Nuttalfs supervision for only a 
short time, and Nuttal testified that he had little contact with 
Thometz (R. 1115). 
Although Thometz was ranked by Hughes and Nuttal in 
approximately April of 1992, Hughes department was not affected 
by the RIF which occurred at that time (R. 815; 1007-1008; 1014). 
During June of 1992, after Nuttal's retirement, Hughes was 
informed that another RIF would occur, wherein her department 
would be required to eliminate two employees (R. 1014). One 
employee voluntarily resigned prior to the RIF, and Thometz was 
RIFed on August 12, 1992 (R. 1092). 
After the initial ranking in April, 1992, Hughes made no 
additional ranking in relation to the subsequent RIF wherein 
Thometz was terminated, which violates Appellant's RIF Policy, 
and is contrary to Hughes and Nuttal's former practice of ranking 
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the employees on approximately a monthly basis (R. 1008; 1109). 
Hughes did not discuss Thometz1 RIF selection with Cary Elder 
("Elder"), who replaced Nuttal as Thometz1 supervisor for a 
period of approximately four months prior to Thometz* RIF (R. 
1018-1019). Appellant did not call Elder as a witness at the 
formal hearing in this case. 
The ALJ carefully considered Nuttal's testimony, and 
concluded that: "Mr. Nuttal had no independent authority to 
construct the [RIF] list, and the list was the product of Ms. 
Hughes1 thought processes, and her understanding of [Thometzf] 
strengths and weaknesses" (R. 779-780). Such finding is 
consistent with Nuttal!s own testimony, wherein Nuttal stated: 
Q. Was Mr. Thometz terminated because of his age? 
A* I have no idea. I wasn't there when he was 
terminated (R. 1113). 
16. Paragraph 16 of Appellant's Statement of Facts quotes 
Hughes' self-serving testimony that age was not a consideration 
in Thometz' RIF selection. Notably, Appellant's Statement of 
Facts contains no reference to the comment which Hughes made to 
Thometz during approximately April of 1992 that Thometz should 
"let some of the younger guys" do a particular task which Thometz 
was performing (R. 1154). Hughes does not deny making such 
comment (R. 1114). 
Footnote 3 to Paragraph 16 of Appellant's Statement of 
Facts refers to two criticisms of Thometz' work performance by 
Hughes. Such criticisms constitute the only criticisms of 
Thometz' work performance which have been identified by 
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Appellant, One of the criticisms refers to an occasion upon 
which Thometz allegedly took too long to inspect a B-52F 
fuselage, and made some type of unspecified error. This alleged 
incident occurred soon after Thometzf transfer into the Specialty 
Structures facility, and was not sufficiently serious that 
Hughes even talked to Thometz about it (R. 1047-1049). The other 
criticism refers to a dispute which Thometz had with some of the 
production area employees. This incident also occurred soon 
after Thometz1 transfer into the Specialty Structures facility. 
At the time, Hughes supported Thometz and determined that Thometz 
had properly halted production (R. 1049-1052; 1152-1154). These 
are the only two occasions upon which deficiencies in Thometz1 
work performance have been identified, both incidents occurred 
shortly after Thometzf transfer into the Specialty Structures 
facility, and there is no allegation of any subsequent problems 
or deficiencies. 
17. Paragraph 17 of Appellant's Statement of Facts sets 
forth Hughes1 alleged reasons for not considering Thometz1 most 
recent PAR in conjunction with her selection of Thometz for RIF. 
Essentially, Hughes claims that she was a harder rater than the 
supervisor who had prepared Thometz1 most recent PAR. However, 
the fact is that Hughes never even looked at Thometz' most recent 
PAR prior to his RIF. Hughes first saw Thometz1 November, 1991 
PAR during the formal hearing in this case (R. 1026). Therefore, 
Hughes1 alleged rationale for not considering Thometz1 PAR is a 
pretext. 
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Appellant's RIF Policy expressly states that PARs should be 
considered in the RIF selection process, and contains no 
exception for PARs which are prepared by differing supervisors 
(R. 34). Hughes clearly did not comply with the RIF Policy. Nor 
did Hughes contact Thometz1 former supervisor, Larry Bradford 
("Bradford"), who had previously supervised both Thometz and co-
worker Jose Garcia ("Garcia"). Garcia was one of the younger 
employees who was retained within the Specialty Structures 
facility at the time of Thometz1 RIF. Bradford considered 
Thometz to be a much more valuable employee than Garcia (R. 
959). 
Footnote 4 to Paragraph 17 of Appellant's Statement of Facts 
refers to testimony by Nuttal that he would have rated Thometz at 
"C-minus" (i.e., less than fully competent) had he performed a 
PAR on Thometz prior to Nuttalfs retirement (R. 1125-1126). 
(Garcia received a "C-minus" within his December, 1991 PAR.) 
However, Nuttal repeatedly testified that Thometz was a competent 
employee (R. 1108; 1124). Nuttal testified that the only reason 
that he would have rated Thometz as less than competent was 
Thometz1 lack of experience in the Specialty Structures facility 
(R. 1125). As previously noted, Nuttal!s experience with Thometz 
was limited to approximately the first four months that Thometz 
worked in the Specialty Structures facility, after which time 
Nuttal retired. Nuttal was not involved in Thometz1 RIF in 
August of 1992. 
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18. Paragraph 18 of Appellant's Statement of Facts quotes 
the self-serving testimony of John Bailey ("Bailey"), Hercules1 
Director of Human Resources, to the effect that the personal 
observations of the supervisors are the most valuable criterion 
for RIF selection, as opposed to documented PARs or work 
histories (R. 1094; 1101-1102). There is nothing within 
Appellant's RIF Policy which supports Bailey's opinion in this 
regard. Bailey admitted during cross-examination that review of 
employees1 documented work history is necessary to protect 
employees against discrimination (R. 1093). In the present case, 
neither Hughes nor the PCC reviewed any documents in relation to 
Thometz' selection for RIF (R. 1009; 1026; 1032). 
19. Thometz admits the allegations of Paragraph 19 of 
Appellant's Statement of Facts. Bradshaw, Walker and Dan Vilart 
("Vilart") all testified that Thometz was clearly a superior 
employee to Garcia (R. 936-938; 959; 975-976). 
20. Thometz admits the allegations of Paragraph 20 of 
Appellant's Statement of Facts. However, contrary to Appellant's 
implication that Walker had insufficient contact with Garcia to 
form an accurate impression regarding Garcia's work performance, 
Walker testified in considerable detail regarding the work 
performance of Garcia and the other employees within the 
Specialty Structures facility (R. 931-943). Walker's awareness 
of the activities within the Specialty Structures facility 
supports the ALJ's finding that Hughes' professed lack of 
awareness of such facts is pretextual (R. 757). 
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21. With reference to Paragraph 21 of Appellant's Statement 
of Facts, Thometz admits that Vilart was RIFed at approximately 
the same time as Thometz, and that, in Vilart1s opinion, both he 
and Thometz were RIFed because of their age (R. 976-977; 980). 
Vilartfs comparison of Thometz and Garcia was based upon his 
experience with both employees during the time that they worked 
within the HTS facility of the Composite Structures Department 
(R. 972-976). The job functions within the HTS facility were 
very similar to those within the Specialty Structures facility 
(R. 854; 990). Vilart testified that the tasks within the 
"closed" section of HTS, where Thometz worked, were more 
technical than those within the "open" section where Garcia 
worked (R. 981). 
22. With reference to Paragraph 22 of Appellant's Statement 
of Facts, Bradford, who supervised both Thometz and Garcia within 
the HTS facility, compared Thometz and Garcia as follows: 
Q. Well, how would you compare, if at all, Mr. 
Thometz1 work performance to that of Mr. Garcia 
during the time that they worked for you? 
A. I would describe them as probably equivalent or 
maybe just slightly an edge to Loel. The 
difference in my opinion between those two 
individuals is that Joe had far less capability 
than Loel, far less experience. Joe can do one 
thing, and he does a pretty good job of it. But 
Loel had experience in several areas, which I 
thought made him a much more valuable employee 
overall. (R. 959). 
23. With reference to Paragraph 23 of Appellantfs 
Statement of Facts, Thometz admits that Hughes1 ranking list "was 
presented, reviewed and approved by the PCC on April 21, 1992." 
15 
In fact, the entire process occurred during a single meeting 
which could not have lasted more than an hour (R. 1033; 1095). 
By the time that Hughes left the meeting, the PCC had approved 
her RIF selection (R. 1039). The RIF list appears to have been 
the only document that was reviewed or prepared in conjunction 
with Thometz1 RIF (R. 1009; 1013; 1026; 1031-1034; 1037; 1094). 
The PCC had no further involvement in Thometz1 RIF (R. 1033). 
However, Thometz was not terminated until a subsequent RIF 
occurred during August of 1992 (R. 1007-1008; 1014). 
24. Paragraph 24 of Appellant's Statement of Facts contains 
a quotation from Bailey wherein he attempts to explain the reason 
that information regarding protected class status, including 
Thometz1 age, appears upon documents prepared by the PCC in 
relation to Thometz1 RIF. 
Bailey's testimony as a whole reflects that he had no 
satisfactory explanation for the PCCfs consideration of protected 
class status, either in general or specifically as it related to 
Thometz. Bailey testified under cross-examination: 
Q. I believe you indicated that some of the notations 
on these documents regarding membership and 
protected class and whatnot were placed there for 
the purpose of ensuring compliance with all of the 
applicable laws; is that correct? 
A. It was placed there to provide information to the 
members of the PCC of those people in protected 
groups so they could comply with the laws. 
Q. Couldn't the PCC comply with the laws simply by 
making their determinations based upon job 
performance rather than nondiscriminatory 
criteria? 
A. That's what they did. 
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Q. And why would they require information regarding 
membership in protected class? 
A. Because they requested it. 
Q. Do you have any idea why the membership of the PCC 
requested that information? 
A. Theyfve requested it since the first PCC we ever 
had (R. 1097). 
There is no evidence in this case as to what, if any, 
use the PCC made of the information which it had with respect to 
Thometz1 age. There is certainly no evidence that Thometz* RIF 
selection received any heightened degree of scrutiny due to the 
PCCfs knowledge of his age. The ALJ found in regard to this 
issue: 
There is really no reason to consider the age, race 
gender, national origin or other impermissible factors 
when a person is determined to be eligible for a RIF 
based upon performance characteristics. Writing down 
such characteristics tends to bolster the view that 
improper factors were being considered. Value to 
Hercules was the professed criterium which Hercules 
claims was the most important attribute. That should 
have been the factor which was preeminent in the minds 
of the PCC and the supervisor. There is at least some 
evidence that other illegal factors were considered, 
and although Hercules may argue that the PCC did the 
antidiscrimination job for which it was created, there 
was little evidence that the PCC acted as the Hercules1 
Reduction in Force Policy stated that it would. (R. 
755-756). 
25-26. Appellant's Statement of Facts, Paragraphs 25 and 
26, contain allegations relating to Thometz1 efforts to obtain 
employment subsequent to his RIF from Hercules. Thometz secured 
new full-time employment within less than two months after his 
RIF from Hercules, while simultaneously attempting to establish 
his own business (R. 883-885). Thometz terminated said 
employment when his employer moved to Kaysville, Utah, and 
Thometz then sought and secured other employment (R. 906-908). 
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Appellant produced no evidence suggesting that Thometz 
failed to mitigate his damages. Appellant could have mitigated 
its damages by reinstating Thometz to employment as per the Order 
of the UADD, dated February 9, 1994 (R. 17). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Thometz disputes the allegation contained within the Summary 
of Argument section of Appellant's Brief, pages 18-19, that "the 
ALJ completely overlooked Thometz1 testimony that his supervisor, 
whose ranking of Thometz was the same as the one approved by the 
PCC, was not biased against him because of his age." As set 
forth within Paragraphs 11-15 of the foregoing Statement of 
Facts, the ALJ expressly considered Nuttalfs testimony i*i detail 
(R. 756-757). Appellant merely disagrees with the ALJfs analysis 
of Nuttal1s testimony. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT DID NOT PRESERVE ANY ARGUMENT THAT THE ALJ 
APPLIED AN IMPROPER LEGAL STANDARD, NOR DID THE ALJ APPLY 
AN IMPROPER LEGAL STANDARD. 
Section I of Appellant's Argument (Appellant's Brief, pages 
20-23), alleges that the ALJ applied an improper standard in 
determining Thometz1 claim, in that the ALJ decided in Thometz1 
favor based solely upon a finding that Thometz established a 
prima facie case of age discrimination. 
Appellant did not raise this issue within the Motion for 
Review which Appellant filed with the Agency (R. 761-769). 
Therefore, this issue is not properly raised on Appeal. Pease v. 
Industrial Com'n of Utah, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984). The 
requirements relating to motions for review of administrative 
orders are applicable to employment discrimination cases. 
Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 860 P.2d 944, 
947-948 (Utah App. 1993). 
Without waiving his objection that Appellant failed to 
preserve any alleged legal error, Thometz responds to the merits 
of Appellant's argument as follows: 
The ALJ committed no error in his analysis of this 
case. The ALJ repeatedly and correctly observed that the 
essential issue in an age discrimination case is whether age was 
a determining factor in regard to the adverse employment action 
(R. 749, 757). Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 49 F.3d 1450, 1454-
55 (10th Cir. 1994). The ALJ performed a detailed analysis of 
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Appellantfs professed non-discriminatory justification i.e., 
"value to Hercules", and found that such professed justification 
lacks credibility under the circumstances of this case (R. 754-
757). Further, the ALJ expressly considered the prima facie case 
factors in ruling upon Appellant's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law (R. 1074-1078). Appellant's Brief contains no 
reference to this portion of the ALJ's decision. 
The prima facie case method of analysis is not intended to 
provide a formalistic approach to the determination of employment 
discrimination cases. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 
note 13; United States Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 
715 (1983). Further, the prima facie case method applies only to 
circumstantial evidence of employment discrimination. It is 
inapplicable where there is direct evidence of discrimination. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. Ill, 121 
(1985). In the present case, the ALJ relied substantially upon 
direct evidence of discrimination, i.e., Hughes1 comment 
regarding Thometzf age (R. 753-754). 
Further, in the present case, all of the elements of the 
prima facie case were either conceded by Appellant or were 
clearly met by Thometz. The only element of the prima facie case 
which Appellant did not concede is element (4): "that [Plaintiff] 
was less favorably treated than younger employees during the 
reduction of force." Appellant's Brief, page 20. Such element 
is not seriously disputed in this case. Thometz was the oldest 
employee within the Specialty Structures facility, and he was 
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the only employee RIFed. Clearly, Thometz was treated less 
favorably than younger employees in regard to the RIF. 
Therefore, Thometz meets element (4) of the prima facie case. 
Appellant's Brief contains no argument that element (4) was not 
met, Appellant merely complains that the ALJ did not expressly 
rule upon element (4). 
Because the prima facie case elements are undisputed, and 
because Thometz produced direct evidence of age discrimination, 
the ALJ properly focused upon the essential issue in this case, 
i.e., whether Thometz1 age was a determining factor in his 
selection for RIF. The ALJ expressly considered Appellant's 
professed justification: "Value to Hercules was the professed 
criterium which Hercules claims was the most important attribute" 
(R. 756). Upon considering all of the evidence, circumstantial 
and direct, the ALJ found that Appellant's professed business 
justification is pretextual (R. 757). 
II. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT RELATING TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE IS PRECLUDED BY APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE 
EVIDENCE, AND THE AGENCY1S DETERMINATION THAT THOMETZ WAS 
TERMINATED IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 34-35-6 IS 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence which supports 
the ALJfs findings of fact as required by Utah law. Matter of 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). Such failure 
improperly burdens the Court and the Appellee, and constitutes 
grounds for the rejection of Appellant's arguments relating to 
the sufficiency of the evidence. Oneido/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1051. 
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Without waiving his objection based upon Appellant's failure 
to marshall the evidence, Thometz addresses the specific 
challenges raised by Appellant to the sufficiency of the 
evidence. 
Appellant's Brief argues on pages 23-25 that Thometz was 
laid off as part of a general, economically motivated RIF, and 
that the RIF was implemented pursuant to Appellant's non-
discriminatory RIF Policy. The ALJ considered these issues at 
length within his Order (R. 750-754). 
The fact that the RIF wherein Thometz was terminated was 
economically motivated is not relevant to determining whether the 
specific selection of Thometz for RIF was substantially motivated 
by Thometz' age. Age discrimination may occur in the context of 
an economically-motivated RIF. James, 21 F.3d 898; Branson, 853 
F.2d 768. 
Nor does the existence of a facially non-discriminatory RIF 
Policy guarantee, as Appellant seems to contend, that unlawful 
discrimination cannot occur, particularly where, as in the 
present case, Appellant substantially failed to comply with its 
RIF Policy. 
Appellant's Brief argues at pages 25-26 that Nuttal 
ranked Thometz at the bottom of the RIF list, and that Thometz 
does not allege that such ranking by Nuttal was discriminatory. 
The circumstances relating to Nuttal's ranking of Thometz are set 
forth within Paragraphs 11 to 15 of the foregoing Statement of 
Facts. Nuttal supervised Thometz for only a short time 
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immediately after Thometzf transfer into the Specialty Structures 
facility. The fact that Nuttalfs ranking was not discriminatory 
does not mean that Hughes ranking, and subsequent RIF of Thometz, 
was not discriminatory. The ALJ expressly considered Nuttalfs 
testimony, together with all of the evidence, in reaching his 
decision (R. 756-757). 
Appellant's Brief argues at pages 26-30 that the ALJ 
improperly second-guessed Appellant's business judgment, in that 
the ALJ considered Thometz to be more highly qualified than did 
Hughes. In fact, the ALJ not only considered Thometz to be more 
qualified, he found that Hughes1 professed ignorance regarding 
Thometz1 work performance and qualifications was pretextual (R. 
757). A finding of pretext does not constitute improper second-
guessing of an employer's business judgment. 
The ALJ expressly recognized the distinction between second-
guessing an employer's business judgment and a finding that an 
employer's professed nondiscriminatory justification is 
pretextual, in ruling upon Appellant's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law: 
The employer can make a stupid decision, make a 
decision on no information as long as it's not based on 
prohibited factors such as age or one of the other 
factors that we've talked about. So far as what 
information Ms. Hughes had with regard to him, as long 
as she wasn't basing it on age, that's not prohibited. 
Of course, like you say, that may be all circumstantial 
evidence supporting it, supporting the case. (R. 1073). 
Appellant argues upon pages 31 and 32 of its Brief that 
"informational notes" regarding the protected class status of 
various employees, including Thometz' age, do not constitute 
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evidence of age discrimination. 
The ALJ properly held that the "informational notes" of the 
PCC constitute some indication that impermissible factors were 
considered (R. 756). Appellant produced no evidence as to why 
this information was provided to the PCC, or of what use the PCC 
made of such information, either generally or specifically in 
Thometzf case. As the ALJ noted, there was no reason for the PCC 
to have such information. The objective of nondiscriminatory RIF 
selections can be achieved by basing decisions solely upon 
nondiscriminatory criteria, such as those set forth within 
Appellant's RIF Policy. The PCC!s use of information regarding 
protected class status necessarily taints the PCC process. 
As Appellant notes, Commissioner Thomas R. Carlson disagrees 
with the ALJfs conclusion that the PCC's use of information 
regarding protected class constitutes evidence of discrimination. 
Nevertheless, Commissioner Carlson concurred in the ALJ's 
decision in this case based upon the direct evidence of 
discrimination (R. 819). 
Appellant argues at pages 32 to 34 of its Brief that the ALJ 
erred as a matter of law in not considering Hughes1 comment 
regarding Thometz1 age to be a "stray remark." This issue 
clearly constitutes a factual issue and not a legal issue. 
Moreover, the ALJ had the benefit of observing Hughes1 testimony 
regarding her comment about Thometz1 age. The cases cited by 
Appellant relating to "stray remarks" involve summary judgment 
issues, rather than circumstances in which the trier of fact 
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actually observed the subject testimony. 
Although there may be circumstances in which ageist remarks 
are not sufficiently connected to an employment action to 
establish discrimination, the ALJ found in the present case that 
Hughes1 remark constituted evidence of age discrimination. 
Hughes1 statement was made by the person who was directly 
responsible for Thometz! RIF, during approximately the same time 
frame in which she was ranking her employees for RIF. Further, 
Hughes1 comment relates directly to Thometz1 ability to perform 
his work. Considered together with the other discrepencies 
within Hughes1 testimony, the ALJ reasonably found that Hughes1 
comment was indicative of an age-related animus on her part. 
Thometz notes that, during her testimony at the formal hearing, 
Hughes gratuitously informed the ALJ that she was the youngest 
person in her department at the time of Thometz1 RIF (R. 1016). 
Appellant argues on pages 34 to 37 of its Brief that the ALJ 
erred as a matter of law in concluding that the statistical 
evidence presented in this case raises an inference of age 
discrimination. Actually, the ALJ held that the statistics which 
were presented at the formal hearing did not establish age 
discrimination, but that they did raise a "caution flag" (R. 
752). 
Most of the stastical evidence which was presented in this 
case was produced by the Appellant, who called an expert 
statistician, Bruce Hopkins ("Hopkins"), presumably for the 
purpose of proving statistically that Appellant did not commit 
25 
age discrimination. During Hopkins' testimony, it became 
apparent to even the least statistically inclined person that a 
substantially higher percentage of employees within the protected 
age group were laid off at the time of Thometzf RIF than had been 
for the three preceding RIFs (R. 815). Hopkins testified that 
this fact was statistically insignificant (R. 1140). However, it 
certainly does not disprove age discrimination in the present 
case. 
The only statistical evidence offered by Thometz in this 
case is the undisputed fact that, out of the 15 employees who 
were RIFed from Appellant's Composite Structures Department at 
the time of Thometz1 RIF, 9 were over the age of 40, and 8, 
including Thometz, were over the age of 50 (R. 875). According 
to Appellant's statistics, approximately one^ -half of Appellant's 
employees at the time of Thometz* RIF were over the age of 40, 
and approximately one-quarter of Appellant's employees were over 
the age of 50 (Appellant's Brief, pages 36^37). Consequently, 
the percentage of older employees who were laid off from Thometzf 
department far exceeded their respective share of the employee 
population. This fact was relied upon by the UADD in finding in 
Thometz1 favor (R. 14). However, Appellant's statistician did 
not address this issue. 
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III. THE AGENCY DID NOT RULE THAT THOMETZ HAS NO DUTY TO 
MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES, AND THOMETZ HAS MITIGATED HIS 
DAMAGES. 
Appellant asserts on page 38 of its Brief that the Agency 
ruled that Thometz has no duty to mitigate his damages. However, 
the Agency's Order actually states in regard to this issue: 
Finally, Hercules argues Mr. Thometz has failed to 
mitigate the damages he suffered from Hercules1 
unlawful discrimination. However, Hercules provides no 
legal or factual analysis in support of this argument. 
The Industrial Commision notes that Mr. Thometz has 
substantially mitigated his damages by obtaining other 
employment. Furthermore, under the decisions issued in 
this matter by the UADD, the ALJ, and now the 
Industrial Commission, Hercules was ordered to 
reinstate Mr. Thometz in his previous position. 
Arguably, Mr. Thometz was under no obligation to seek 
or accept work elsewhere (R. 818). 
Once a plaintiff establishes unlawful discrimination and 
presents evidence of damages, the employer bears the burden of 
proving that the Plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence 
in mitigating his damages. Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 
1481, 1493 (10th Cir. 1989). In order to carry its burden, the 
employer must show that with the exercise of reasonable diligence 
there was a reasonable chance that the employee might have found 
comparable employment. Donnelly v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 
874 F.2d 402, 411 (7th Cir. 1989). 
In the present case, Appellant has presented no evidence 
that Thometz could have obtained comparable employment through 
the exercise of reasonable diligence. To the contrary, 
Appellant's extensive RIFs over the two years prior to Thometz1 
RIF, together with the general economic downturn in the aerospace 
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and defense industries makes it highly unlikely that Thometz 
could have found comparable employment. 
Thometz reasonably mitigated his damages by obtaining 
alternative employment within two months after his RIF, while 
simultaneously attempting to establish his own business. 
Further, Thometz1 subsequent termination of said employment when 
the employer moved to Kaysville, Utah was reasonable, in view of 
the commute which would be required and the fact that it was the 
slow time of the year. After such termination, Thometz again 
sought and secured alternative employment. 
IV. THOMETZ SHOULD BE AWARDED BACKPAY AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
INCURRED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THIS APPEAL. 
Thometz should be awarded the attorney's fees and costs 
which he has incurred in defending this Appeal. Verbraeken v. 
Westinqhouse Electric Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1052-53 (11th Cir. 
1989). Additionally, Thometz should be awarded the backpay which 
he has continued to accrue to the present time as a result of 
Appellant!s refusal to comply with the Order of the Industrial 
Commission. Coates v. Nat!l Cash Register Co./ 433 F.Supp. 655, 
663 (D.C. Va. 1977); Bishop v. Jelleff Assoc, 398 F.Supp. 579, 
597 (D.C.D.C. 1974). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing authorities, facts and arguments, 
the Appellee Loel D. Thometz respectfully requests that the 
Orders of the Administrative Law Judge and of the Industrial 
Commission be affirmed, and that Thometz be awarded his costs and 
attorneys fees incurred in defending this Appeal, together with 
the backpay which Thometz has accrued during the pendency of this 
Appeal• . 
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